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Abstract: In the literature responding to the problem of sexual violence by UN peacekeepers, 
scholars have focused on ‘shame’, ‘danger’ and even ‘hope’ as values around which to frame 
accountability processes. The premise of this article is that the UN’s failure to prevent sexual 
abuse and exploitation by peacekeepers is primarily a betrayal of trust, such that one of the 
central roles of accountability processes should be to work to repair and restore trust. Of course, 
the concept of trust is context specific and can have interpersonal, financial and political 
manifestations and implications. It also has legal relevance. I argue that trust is foundational to 
our understanding of the legal authority exercised by UN peacekeepers. In legal terms, we can 
classify the relationship between UN peacekeepers and the foreign populations over which they 
exercise authority in the nature of a fiduciary relationship. Because the fiduciary relationship is 
legal in nature, it generates legal duties, including the duty to account to those over whom it 
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No other continent has endured such an unspeakably bizarre combination of 
foreign thievery and foreign goodwill. 
– Barbara Kingsolver, The Poisonwood Bible  
 
Sexual abuse is a very human stain that has marked many organizations that define 
themselves through virtue, including the church, schools, scouting organizations 
and other humanitarian organizations. The exposure of sexual abuse by United 
Nations (UN) peacekeepers reveals behaviour that is undoubtedly unconscionable, 
but surely not inconceivable. While the UN was constructed from plans to deliver 
peace, security, development and human rights, the organization was inescapably 
hewn from the crooked timber of humanity. The UN is ultimately a creature of the 
world upon which it seeks to act. The reality of sexual abuse by UN peacekeepers 
has been destructive of the organization’s legitimacy, yet so is any fantasy about the 
imagined purity of the organization and its personnel. Scholarly attention to the 
development of an accountability framework for UN peacekeeping is critical so as 
to avoid not only overly romantic, but also overly cynical, readings of the nature of 
the organization. 
In an article forthcoming in the European Journal of International Law, Rosa 
Freedman calls for a ‘new approach to accountability’ in response to sexual abuse 
by UN peacekeepers.1 Her focus is on accountability as a process rather than a value. 
Freedman highlights the importance of a victim-centred approach, arguing for the 
need to place relevant aspects of criminal justice, truth and reconciliation, human 
rights and political processes at the heart of accountability responses. In this short 
article, my focus will be on the currency, rather than the metal, of the accountability 
coin, giving regard to the value or values we expect accountability to serve in this 
setting rather than to its processes. It is hoped that this will provide an interesting 
foundation to support, but also to critique, elements of Freedman’s discussion.  
History tells that the humanitarian nature of an institution or authority is no 
antidote to misdeed. Certainly for the countries in which the highest number of UN 
sexual abuse allegations has been recorded (Haiti, the Central African Republic, the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo and South Sudan), the history of 
humanitarianism is also a history of paternalism. Both ‘isms’ involve ‘the act of 
interfering in the lives of others, often without their permission, on the grounds that 
such interventions are for their own good’.2 In order to avoid one sliding into the 
other, humanitarians must navigate a delicate balance between care and control. 
Michael Barnett has tracked the history of humanitarianism, drawing chilling 
comparisons between the ‘civilizing mission’ of empire and liberal 
humanitarianism.3 Of course, there is also a key normative distinction between these 
                                                      
1 Freedman, ‘UNaccountable: A New Approach to Peacekeepers and Sexual Abuse’ (forthcoming, 
European Journal of International Law). 
2 M. Barnett, Empire of Humanity (2011), at 233.  
3 Ibid. 
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projects. To effectively distinguish itself from imperial governance, humanitarian 
governance must stake its legitimacy on purpose: to act for the benefit of the ruled 
rather than of the rulers. The legitimacy of humanitarian governance is dependent 
on the idea that humanitarian agencies act not out of self-interest but, rather, as a 
public trustee and for the benefit of the ruled.  
At the heart of the relationship, therefore, is trust. In the literature responding 
to the problem of sexual violence by UN peacekeepers, scholars have focused on 
‘shame’, ‘danger’ and even ‘hope’.4 My argument is that ‘trust’, at least from an 
institutional perspective, is the key institutional value that is betrayed by reported 
(and unreported) cases of sexual abuse by UN peacekeepers and is the value that 
accountability processes must seek to restore. Of course, the concept of trust is 
context specific and can have interpersonal, financial and political manifestations 
and implications.5 It also has legal relevance. I argue that trust is foundational to our 
understanding of the legal authority exercised by UN peacekeepers. In legal terms, 
we can classify the relationship between UN peacekeepers and the foreign 
populations over which they exercise authority in the nature of a fiduciary 
relationship. Because the fiduciary relationship is legal in nature, it generates legal 




1.  THE VERY DISAPPOINTING HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL 
TRUSTEESHIP 
 
The notion of trusteeship can be traced (though, evidently, the notion was not 
passably implemented) to the time of the British Empire. The origins of trusteeship 
have been attributed to Edmund Burke in his attempt to place colonial rule on a 
humanitarian footing.6 Following the dissolution of the East India Company, there 
was ‘a shift in ideology justifying Empire from the vulgar language of profit to that 
of order, proper governance and humanitarianism’.7 In Burke’s famous speech on 
the (ultimately defeated) East India bill of 1783, he noted:  
 
All political power which is set over men, and that all privilege claimed or 
exercised in exclusion of them, being wholly artificial, and for so much a 
derogation from the natural equality of mankind at large, ought to be some way 
                                                      
4 Engle, ‘The Grip of Sexual Violence: Reading UN Security Council Resolutions on Human Security’ 
and Shepherd, ‘The Road to (and from) “Recovery”: A Multidisciplinary Feminist Approach to 
Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding’, both in G. Heathcote and D. Otto, Rethinking Peacekeeping, Gender 
Equality and Collective Security (2014). 
5 Harding, ‘Manifesting Trust’, 29 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (2009) 245, at 246. 
6 Though Ralph Wilde notes that the concept is also evident in the ideas of Francisco de Vitoria and 
Bartolome de Las Casas in relation to Spanish colonialism in the 16th century. Wilde, ‘From Trusteeship 
to Self-Determination and Back Again’, 31 Loyola and Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review 
(2009) 85, at 96.  
7 A. Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (2005), at 69. 
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or other exercised ultimately for their benefit. … [S]uch rights or privileges … 
are all in the strictest sense a trust; and it is of the very essence of every trust to 
be rendered accountable.8  
 
This is not the article in which to engage in a full exploration of the developing 
notion of trusteeship in theory through colonial protectorates, mandates of the 
League of Nations and, ultimately, trust territories administered through the UN 
Trusteeship Council – and the extent of its betrayal in practice. This is a task that 
has been carried out amply by other scholars.9 In many respects, the history of 
trusteeship is one of perversion of the concept of trust, contradicting the idea that 
the trustee is supposed to be acting selflessly in the interests of the beneficiary only 
and not also for its own sake.10 A central critique of colonialism, despite Burke’s 
attempts, is that it was associated explicitly with policies concerning the interests of 
the colonial state and its settlers.11 Less discussed is the extent to which the League 
of Nations’ Mandate system failed to provide adequate protection to vulnerable 
populations, though examples are well known and easily identifiable. In the South 
West Africa case, the International Court of Justice determined that League states 
had no legal right or interest in checking the general well-being of the inhabitants of 
Mandate territories, including the compliance of the mandatory power with 
fundamental human rights norms.12 This was in spite of the fact Article 22 of the 
Covenant of the League of Nations describes the well-being and development of 
peoples in Mandate territories as forming a ‘sacred trust of civilization’.13 
In previous eras, the international legal conception of ‘sovereignty’ stood 
between trustee states and the rights of the populations with which such states were 
supposedly ‘entrusted’. Trusteeship remained a limited notion in an era in which 
controlled or ‘trust’ territories were not sovereign, meaning that virtually no legal 
restrictions were imposed on the actions of administering powers with respect to 
the peoples living within them. In the colonial era, any restrictions on the actions of 
imperial powers towards colonial territories resulted from conflicts between 
imperial states regarding the same territory, not from any rights on the part of 
                                                      
8 Burke, ‘Speech on Fox’s East India Bill (1783)’, in The Writings and Speeches of Edmund Burke (1901), vol. 2, 
at 439, cited in Boisen, ‘The Changing Moral Justification of Empire: From the Right to Colonise to the 
Obligation to Civilize’, 39(3) History of European Ideas (2013) 335, at 346. 
9 See, e.g., Fitzmaurice, ‘Sovereign Trusteeship and Empire’, 16 Theoretical Inquiries in Law (2015) 447; R. 
Wilde, International Territorial Administration: How Trusteeship and the Civilizing Mission Never Went Away (2008); 
B. Ibhawoh, Imperialism and Human Rights: Colonial Discourses of Rights and Liberties in African History (2006); 
Anghie, supra note 6; A.W. Brian Simpson, Human Rights and the End of Empire: Britain and the Genesis of the 
European Convention (2001), ch. 6; S. N’zatioula Grovogui, Sovereigns, Quasi-Sovereigns and Africans (1996); K. 
Robinson, The Dilemmas of Trusteeship: Aspects of British Colonial Policy between the Wars (1965). 
10 Wilde, ‘Understanding the International Territorial Administration Accountability Deficit: Trusteeship 
and the Legitimacy of International Organizations’, 12 Journal of International Peacekeeping (2008) 93, at 107. 
11 W. Bain, Between Anarchy and Society: Trusteeship and the Obligations of Power (2003). 
12 South West Africa (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa), Second Phase, Judgment [1966] ICJ Rep. 
51. See Dugard, ‘1966 and All That: The South West Africa Judgment Revisited in the East Timor Case’, 
8 African Journal of International and Comparative Law (1996) 549, at 550. 
13 Covenant of the League of Nations 1919, 13 AJIL Supp. 128 (1919). 
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colonial territories or their populations.14 Even in the South West Africa case, the ICJ 
concluded that considerations of state sovereignty and strict adherence to the 
requirement of consent to adjudication should prevail over wider community 
interests in the advancement of human rights. 
For an understanding of ‘trust’ that might guide us in the modern era, we must 
look to the future not the past. The concept of trust is central to explaining how 
UN peacekeeping should be rendered accountable, while the history of trusteeship 





2.  THE UN AS FIDUCIARY 
 
At its inception, UN peacekeeping was a consensual, non-interventionist, non-
coercive military activity.15 No longer. Following the end of the Cold War, so-called 
multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations have become typical, frequently 
involving a significant peace-building component, which can include operating, 
strengthening and rebuilding state institutions.16 The UN Handbook on UN 
Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations acknowledges that peacekeeping operations 
may be required to ‘[a]dminister a territory for a transitional period, thereby carrying 
out all the functions that are normally the responsibility of a government’.17 Frédéric 
Mégret and Florian Hoffman have labelled these operations ‘the new protectorates’ 
in recognition that some peace operations have transformed into fully-fledged 
international administrations.18 
The enormity of this potential mandate should lead us to inquire into the basis 
for UN peacekeeping authority. It is clear that UN peacekeepers cannot claim 
political authority to perform public functions on behalf of a population, in the 
sense of authority derived from the consent of the peoples in relation to whom they 
act. Technically, peacekeeping forces are deployed on the basis of the consent of 
the host state, normally reflected in the negotiation and adoption of a status-of-
forces agreement between the UN and a host state.19 However, given that 
peacekeeping forces most often operate in volatile or weak post-conflict states, 
characterized by the collapse or degradation of state structures, anything close to 
                                                      
14 Anghie, supra note 6, at 103. 
15 White, ‘Peacekeeping and International Law’, in J. Koops et al., Oxford Handbook of United Nations 
Peacekeeping Operations (2015) 43, at 44. 
16 Report of the Panel of UN Peace Operations, UN Doc. S/2000/809, 21 August 2000; S. Chesterman, 
You, the People: The United Nations, Transitional Administration and State-Building (2005), at 4–5; Chopra, 
‘Introducing Peace Maintenance’, 4 Global Governance (1998) 1.  
17 Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Handbook on UN Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations, 
December 2003, available at https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/peacekeeping-
handbook_un_dec2003_0.pdf.  
18 Mégret and Hoffman, ‘The UN as Human Rights Violator? Some Reflections on the United Nations 
Changing Human Rights Responsibilities’, 25 Human Rights Quarterly (2003) 314, at 327. 
19 White, supra note 14, at 48. 
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informed consent of the local populations becomes improbable. As stated in the 
UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations’ Principles and Guidelines, ‘[t]he fact that 
the main parties have given their consent to the deployment of a United Nations 
peacekeeping operation does not necessarily imply or guarantee that there will also 
be consent at the local level, particularly if the main parties are internally divided or 
have weak command and control systems’.20  
UN peacekeeping forces do not exercise political authority, implicating as this 
does the idea of political representation. The authority of UN peacekeepers is best 
described as legal, rather than political, in nature, derived from legal, rather than 
political, sources. The foundation of UN peacekeeping authority is the UN Charter, 
including Chapters 6, 7 and 8 and, more specifically, the UN Security Council 
resolution(s) establishing its mandate.21 In turn, the scope of this mandate is tied 
inextricably to the purposes of the UN. In the Certain Expenses case, the ICJ found 
that, as long as peacekeeping operations fulfilled one of the stated purposes of the 
UN, the presumption is that such action is not ultra vires the organization.22 The 
authority of UN peacekeeping forces is based on the expectation that they will carry 
out certain legally authorized purposes and functions. 
So far, this says nothing new. Functionalism is the traditional measure of the 
legality of the conduct of international institutions, connecting legality to fulfilment 
of an institution’s mandated functions.23 However, the inadequacy of functionalism 
to explain the scope of UN authority, particularly in relation to international 
organizations of general jurisdiction, has also been persuasively argued. Felix S. 
Cohen compared functionalism in law to functionalist architecture, which is 
‘likewise a repudiation of outworn symbols and functionless forms that have no 
meaning – hollow marble pillars that do not support, fake buttresses, and false 
fronts’.24 Drawing on Cohen’s work, Anne Orford notes that, just as positivism left 
the law homeless in Weimar Germany, so functionalism has left international law 
‘subjectless and thus homeless’.25 As Jan Klabbers has identified, functionalism is a 
principal-agent theory, where the principal (the member states) assigns a set of 
functions to an agent (the international organization) and has little to say about 
relations with actors other than those member states.26 The delineation of UN 
                                                      
20 UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Principles and Guidelines (2008), at 32, available at 
www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/capstone_eng.pdf; see also Gray, ‘Host State Consent and 
United Nations Peacekeeping in Yugoslavia’, 7 Duke Journal of International Law and Policy (1996) 241. 
21 Ibid., at 13–14. 
22 Certain Expenses of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 20 July 1962, ICJ Reports (1962) 151, at 168. 
23 Virally, ‘La notion de function dans la théorie de l’Organisation internationale’, in Mélanges offerts à Charles 
Rousseau: La Communauté internationale (1974) 277; Mitrany, ‘The Functional Approach to World 
Organization’, 24 International Affairs (1948) 350, at 351; Klabbers, ‘The Emergence of Functionalism in 
International Institutional Law’, 25 European Journal of International Law (EJIL) (2014) 645. 
24 Cohen, ‘Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach’, 35(6) Columbia Law Review (1935) 809, 
at 822-823. 
25 A. Orford, International Authority and the Responsibility to Protect (2011), at 195. 
26 Klabbers, ‘Functionalism, Constitutionalism and the United Nations’, in A.F. Lang and A. Wiener 
(eds), Research Handbook on Global Constitutionalism (2017) 358. 
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functions says nothing about the proper subjects of UN authority, the standards or 
principles by which its actions may be assessed or the means by which it may be 
held to account.  
Recognition of the foundation of UN peacekeeping authority in law has 
consequences beyond those identified by functionalist theory. Where the law 
entrusts irresistible discretionary power over the interests of another party – 
interests that are vulnerable by virtue of that power – this establishes a relationship 
premised on a presumption of trust. The basis of this authority is the controlling 
authority’s subjection to, and compliance with, the requirements of the trust-like 
position in which it stands vis-à-vis its legal subjects. Such a presumption renders the 
controlling authority’s exercise of power justifiable to the beneficiary, for it is on 
trust (rather than the beneficiary’s consent) that the authority depends. One way of 
thinking about this trust-like relationship in legal terms is to recognize a fiduciary 
relationship. Here, I draw on a growing body of literature that characterizes the 
relationship between state or state-like institutions and those subject to their 
authority as fiduciary in nature.27 A fiduciary relationship arises where one party 
holds discretionary power of an administrative nature over the important interests 
of another and this latter party (the beneficiary) is unable, either as a matter of fact 
or law, to control or exercise the power held by the fiduciary.28 The relationship is 
premised on the idea that the vesting of legal authority would be frustrated if the 
authorized party could act without due regard for the other’s interests and the 
purpose for which the authority is granted. As Evan Fox-Decent explains, ‘[t]he 
beneficiary’s trust may be thought of as an unarticulated and legitimate expectation 
that the fiduciary’s power will be exercised on her behalf and for her ends, rather 
than say for the sake of the fiduciary’s ends’.29  
The notion of trust provides a foundation for an accountability framework for 
UN peacekeeping. Fiduciary theory is fundamentally legal and relational, offering a 
method to explain what it means for institutions to hold and exercise public 
authority on behalf of others.30 The recognition of fiduciary obligations renders the 
fiduciary liable to the beneficiary should the fiduciary breach them. The concept of 
public institutions as fiduciaries is a topic that I can only begin to tackle in this 
article, though it is an idea that others have taken the time to explore in more detail, 
particularly in the context of state institutions.31 My sense is that the fiduciary 
architecture can orient us in figuring out the scope of UN accountability in cases of 
                                                      
27 D. Gordon Smith, G.L. Farr and A.S. Gold, Research Handbook on Fiduciary Law (forthcoming); D. 
Vitale, ‘Trust and the Administration of Social Welfare Entitlements’ (2018) (PhD thesis on file at 
London School of Economics); E. Fox-Decent, Sovereignty’s Promise: The State as Fiduciary (2011); E. 
Criddle and E. Fox-Decent, Fiduciaries of Humanity (2016); Leib, Ponet and Serota, ‘Translating Fiduciary 
Principles into Public Law’, 126 Harvard Law Review Forum (2013) 91; Finn, ‘The Forgotten “Trust”: The 
People and the State’, in M. Cope (ed.), Equity: Issues and Trends (1995) 131. 
28 Fox-Decent, supra note 26, ch. 4. 
29 Ibid., at 243. 
30 Criddle and Fox-Decent, supra note 26, at 352. 
31 Of particular relevance in international terms are Criddle and Fox-Decent, supra note 26; Benvenisti, 
‘Sovereigns as Trustees of Humanity: On the Accountability of States to Foreign Stakeholders’, 107(2) 
American Journal of International Law (AJIL) (2013) 295. 
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sexual abuse by UN peacekeepers. It has been argued that it provides a legal basis 
for institutional accountability in cases relating to the sexual abuse of Aboriginal 
children in Indian residential schools32 and sexual misconduct by clergy against 
parishioners.33 While it is necessary to distinguish institutional from individual 
accountability, institutional claims for breach of fiduciary duty may arise out of an 
organization’s failure to investigate allegations of wrong, its failure to warn potential 
victims or its failure to take earlier remedial action against known wrongdoers.  
By putting trust at the heart of the legal relationship, it also becomes important 
to ensure that accountability frameworks strengthen, and do not in themselves 
corrode, public trust in an institution. A range of scholars have recognized the 
capacity for overly intrusive forms of accountability and regulation to become 
counter-productive or debilitating, driving out opportunities for trusting 
relationships and reducing the level of performance in the very area they are 
supposed to effect.34 Fiduciary theory looks to ‘create room for relationships to 
breathe to help avoid “crowding out” … trust’.35 For example, the focus should be 
on institutional design rather than on judicial micromanagement so as to nurture a 
relationship with the organization rather than encouraging beneficiaries to seek 
recourse outside it. In terms of accountability following organizational crisis, 
continuing trust in the organization is best served where the organization carries out 
the therapeutic work of publicly acknowledging the plight of those experiencing 
risk, harm and trauma, the diagnostic work of truth telling, the inquisitorial work of 
establishing responsibility and the reconstructive work of lesson drawing.36 The 
quest is for ‘meaningful’ accountability, with the aim being to support the intelligent 




3.  DEVELOPING AN ACCOUNTABILITY FRAMEWORK: TRUST IN 
THE BALANCE 
 
In her article, Freedman determines that ‘the ad hoc evolution and policies 
governing such activities and personnel has contributed to a crisis of accountability 
for harms caused by peacekeepers’. She acknowledges problems in holding the UN 
                                                      
32 Cloud v. Canada, (2004) 73 OR(3d) 401, para. 12, 247 DLR (4th) 667; Blackwater v. Plint, 2005 SCC 58, 
para. 61, [2005] 3 SCR 3; Bonaparte v. Canada, (2003) 64 OR 3d 1, para. 21. 
33 Martinelli v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 196 F.3d 409, at 426–30 (2d Cir. 1999); Doe v. Evans, 
814 So. 2d 370 (Fla. 2002). 
34 O’Neill, ‘Trust, Trustworthiness and Accountability’, in N. Morris and D. Vines, Capital Failure: 
Rebuilding Trust in Financial Services (2014); Pettit, ‘The Cunning of Trust’, 24(3) Philosophy and Public Affairs 
(1995) 202; Leib, Ponet and Serota, supra note 26. 
35 Leib, Ponet and Sorota, supra note 26, at 100. 
36 Kuipers and Hart, ‘Accounting for Crises’, in M. Bovens, R.E. Goodin and T. Schillemans, Oxford 
Handbook of Public Accountability (2014) 589, at 600. 
37 O’Neill, supra note 33, at 180; Bovens and Schillemans, ‘Meaningful Accountaiblity’, in Bovens, Goodin 
and Schillemans, supra note 35, 673. 
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to account given the scope of existing immunities and uncertainty over the extent 
to which the UN is bound by international human rights law. Against this uncertain 
legal landscape, her proposal for a ‘holistic and victim-centred approach’ to 
accountability is essentially policy based. My hope in outlining the above is to 
provide a normative foothold for the regime she proposes. Additionally, the 
recognition of the fiduciary obligations of the UN provides a basis upon which to 
elaborate, but also to delimit, the scope of UN accountability in the peacekeeping 
setting.  
One of Freedman’s main accountability aims is to promote a ‘human rights-
based approach’. Yet, in exploring the parameters of this possibility legally, her focus 
is on the relationship between UN immunity and human rights. To my mind, this 
casts the accountability problem too narrowly. The question of accountability 
implicates a broader problem than the immunity of the UN and its institutions 
before domestic courts. By focusing on the capacity to bring the UN before 
domestic courts, there is a danger in overlooking the more fundamental legal 
concern that the UN considers ensuring human rights protections for administered 
populations is essentially a policy decision rather than something the UN is legally 
bound to do. As the independent ombudsperson in Kosovo declared in relation to 
failures by the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo to ensure the 
Kosovar population were granted human rights protections, ‘[i]t is ironic that the 
United Nations, the self-proclaimed champion of human rights in the world, has by 
its own actions placed the people of Kosovo under UN control, thereby removing 
them from the protection of the human rights regime that formed the justification 
for UN engagement in Kosovo in the first place’.38 In developing a legal foundation 
for accountability frameworks, fiduciary theory can do important work. The 
recognition of the UN’s fiduciary relationship with populations under its 
administration provides a legal basis for accountability if the UN fails to take 
adequate measures to prevent and protect such populations from human rights 
violations.39  
Many of the accountability frameworks proposed by Freedman are drawn from 
the international criminal setting. One problem with this approach is highlighted by 
Freedman herself who recognizes that ‘accountability in relation to UN 
peacekeepers must… go beyond traditional calls solely for criminal law processes’. 
The top-down case management model which remains dominant in the context has 
its limitations. Westendorf has written persuasively about the danger of focusing 
too heavily on procedures for the investigation and prosecution of allegations, 
reinforcing an individualised conduct and discipline approach and thereby failing to 
                                                      
38 Ombudsperson Institution in Kosovo, Second Annual Report (2001–2002), at 5, available at 
www.ombudspersonkosovo.org/repository/docs/E6020710a_845763.pdf.  
39 For an alternative legal analysis, see Roísín Burke’s focus on due diligence, which directs attention to 
the troop-contributing state rather than the United Nations as the source of accountability: ‘Shaming the 
State: Sexual Offences by UN Military Peacekeepers and the Rhetoric of Zero Tolerance’ in Heathcote 
and Otto, supra note 4. 
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address the complex mix of permissive and motivating factors that give rise to sexual 
exploitation and abuse.40  
The underlying notion of trust might also lead us to question some of the more 
exaggerated demands Freedman makes of accountability. The call for an 
internationalized hybrid tribunal and truth commission draw on international 
criminal justice and transitional justice models of accountability designed to move 
whole societies on from regimes under whose banner populations have been 
subjected to gross violations of human rights. Account must be taken of the 
significant costs of setting up these bodies to ensure that they do not 
disproportionately overburden the organization and siphon critical resources from 
other UN operations. Other problems with the international criminal law model are 
highlighted by Freedman’s claim that UN failure to prevent sexual misconduct by 
peacekeepers ‘amount[s] to torture’. I accept that the allegation is not that the UN 
has itself engaged in acts of torture in violation of the prohibition, but that is has 
violated the obligation under Article 2 of the Convention to prevent torture. The 
Committee Against Torture’s General Comment No 2 confirms that ‘each State 
party should prohibit, prevent and redress torture…in all contexts of custody or 
control’, including in ‘peacekeeping operations’.41 My problem here is not so much 
with the idea that the UN has an obligation to prevent torture, but with the potential 
distortion entailed in broadly classifying sexual misconduct by peacekeepers as 
torture. The evidence does not support the suggestion that the majority of sexual 
abuse was carried out as an intentional policy to obtain information, punish, 
intimidate or discriminate against individuals, as the definition of torture requires.42 
Jasmine-Kim Westendorf and Louise Searle conducted a review in which they 
recognize that the range of sexual exploitation and abuse perpetrated by 
peacekeepers is diverse and driven by different motivating factors, encompassing 
opportunistic sexual exploitation, transactional sex, networked sexual exploitation 
as well as  planned, sadistic attacks.43 The 2005 Zeid report, which was 
commissioned by the UN to provide a comprehensive investigation of peacekeeper 
abuse, shows that, at least in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the majority 
of allegations relate to transactional sex, including the exchange of sex for money, 
food and jobs.44 
                                                      
40 Westendorf, ‘WPS, CRSV and sexual exploitation and abuse in peace operations: making sense of the 
missing links’, LSE Women, Peace and Security Working Paper Series, 9/2017 (2017), available at 
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/85992/1/WP9_2017.pdf. 
41Committee Against Torture, General Comment No. 2, UN Doc. CAT/C/GC/2 (24 January 2008), 
paras 15-16. 
42 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 1984, 
1465 UNTS 85, Art. 1. 
43 Westendorf and Searle, ‘Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Peace Operations: Trends, Policy Responses 
and Future Directions’, 93(2) International Affairs (2017) 365. 
44 Zeid Ra’ad Zeid Al-Hussein, A Comprehensive Strategy to Eliminate Future SEA in UN Peacekeeping 
Operations, UN Doc. A/59/710 (2005), para. 6.  
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That is not to say that there are no individual instances of sexual abuse by UN 
peacekeepers that might be classified as torture.45 While not seeking in any way to 
repudiate or diminish the need for the UN to account for incidents of sadistic abuse 
and to deploy all reasonable means to prevent future incidents, the holistic 
characterization of peacekeeper sexual misconduct as torture, and the development 
of accountability frameworks based on the characterization of the relevant conduct 
as torture, requires careful consideration and justification. It is important that 
accountability frameworks target all forms of sexual misconduct, including but not 
limited to torture. As Freedman herself emphasizes, a critical aspect of 
accountability is that those affected have a right to have their stories told. Heathcote 
has written about the danger of reinforcing the stereotype of the non-Western 
victim subject, to whom restricted agency and seemingly perpetual vulnerability are 
attributed.46 The source of the ‘problem’ becomes located in the personality of the 
victim population, implicitly questioning its capacity for agency and self-
government.47 It is clearly important to distinguish between legal consensual sex, 
commercial prostitution, ‘survival sex’ and serious criminal offences of a sexual 
nature, such as abuse of children, rape and torture. Law must seek to use language 
that most accurately identifies the crime and its nature.48 Legal language ‘reinforces 
certain world views and understandings of events … Through its definitions and 
the way it talks about events, law has the power to silence alternative meanings – to 
suppress other stories’.49 It is important to recognize rape as torture where 
appropriate,50 but it is also important to recognize rape as rape and for accountability 
frameworks to provide scope to understand the particular nature of the UN’s 
failings in relation to sexual exploitation and abuse by UN peacekeepers.  
The importance of not mischaracterizing the nature of the UN’s wrongdoing 
is significant not just for victims but also for the preservation and protection of 
international legal structures including international criminal law and, indeed, the 
UN itself. In 2010, against the backdrop of the emerging scale of sexual abuse 
against minors by Catholic priests, Geoffrey Robertson made headlines when he 
claimed that Pope Benedict XVI could be ‘put in the dock’ for crimes against 
humanity and might bear command responsibility for widespread and systematic 
                                                      
45 Indeed, a leaked internal 2015 UN report documents instances (less common, though not isolated) of 
rape for the sadistic pleasure of the perpetrators, involving both planning and coordination. These 
instances include allegations of the oral and anal rape of homeless and starving boys aged 8 to 15 by 26 
peacekeepers from France, Chad and Equatorial Guinea and the beating and rape of a teenage boy by 
Canadian peacekeepers in Somalia: Westendorf and Searle, supra note 43, at 370. 
46 Heathcote, ‘Participation, Gender and Security’ in Heathcote and Otto, supra note 4, at 50. 
47 Pupavac, ‘War on the couch: The emotionology of the new international security paradigm’, 7(2) 
European Journal of Social Theory (2004) 149, at 163. 
48 Askin, ‘Sexual Violence in Decisions and Indictments of the Yugoslav and Rwandan Tribunals: Current 
Status’, 93 AJIL (1999) 97, at 101, n. 31; Askin, War Crimes against Women: Prosecution in International War 
Crimes Tribunals (1997), at xv; Chinkin, ‘Rape and Sexual Abuse of Women in International Law’, 5 EJIL 
(1994) 326, at 329, n. 22. 
49 Finley, ‘Breaking Women’s Silence in Law: The Dilemma of the Gendered Nature of Legal Reasoning’, 
64 Notre Dame Law Review (1989) 886, at 888, cited in Sivakumaran, ‘Sexual Violence against Men in 
Armed Conflict’, 18(2) EJIL (2007) 253.  
50 M. Peel, Rape as a Method of Torture (2004). 
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molestation of children by priests in the Catholic Church.51 While these claims 
attract headlines and may be effective in terms of advocacy, they also serve to dilute 
and distort important legal categories that must be preserved in order to effectively 
identify and target particular types of harm in international society. Inappropriate or 
disproportionate accountability frameworks do not aid the task of reconciliation and 
can serve instead to alienate and divide sympathies in a way that does not ultimately 
serve victims. In terms of the UN, misplaced claims that it has engaged in torture 
would also have a destructive effect on its future effectiveness. The aim of 
accountability mechanisms is to restore trust, not to erode it further by 
mischaracterizing the failure to prevent sexual exploitation by peacekeepers as 




4.  CONCLUSION 
 
In her article, Freedman lays down an important challenge to develop a new 
approach to accountability. She concludes by recognizing that much about 
accountability for sexual abuse by UN peacekeepers remains unclear, leaving 
unanswered critical questions such as ‘what accountability looks like and who needs 
to be accountable to whom and in what matter’. My proposal is to add the 
preliminary question of ‘why’ to the mix, not out of any doubt that accountability is 
due but, rather, to guide us in answering Freedman’s concluding questions. In this 
brief article, I argue that the UN’s failure to prevent sexual abuse and exploitation 
of peacekeepers is primarily a betrayal of trust, such that one of the central roles of 
accountability processes should be to work to repair and restore trust.52 The UN 
flag should not be used as a veil against accountability, but nor should it make the 
UN an indiscriminate target. Accountability frameworks should serve to make an 





                                                      
51 G. Robertson, ‘Put the Pope in the Dock’, The Guardian (2 April 2010), available at 
www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/libertycentral/2010/apr/02/pope-legal-immunity-international-
law.  
52 Tellingly, the Report of the Independent Review on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by International 
Peacekeeping Forces in the Central African Republic (2015), available at 
www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/centafricrepub/Independent-Review-Report.pdf, commences with the 
charge: ‘Where peacekeepers exploit the vulnerability of the very people they have been sent to protect by 
sexually abusing members of the local population, it is a fundamental betrayal of trust. When the United 
Nations (the “UN” or “Organization”) fails to address such crimes quickly and decisively, that betrayal is 
compounded and the important contributions of peacekeeping missions are undermined.’  
 
 
